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Summary
The paper analyzes the optimal structure of board of directors in a firm with ownership
concentrated in the hands of a large shareholder who sits on the board. We focus our
attention on the choice between one-tier board who performs all tasks and two-tier
board where the management board is in charge of project selection and the supervisory
board is in charge of monitoring. We consider the case in which the large shareholder
sits on (and controls) the supervisory board but not the management board. We show
that a two-tier structure can limit the interference of large shareholders and can restore
manager’s incentive to exert effort to become informed on new investment projects
without reducing the large, shareholder’s incentive to monitor the manager. This results
in higher expected profits in a two-tier board than in one-tier board and the difference in
profits can be sufficiently high to induce large shareholders to prefer a two-tier board
despite the fact that in this case the manager selects his preferred projects rather than the
project preferred by large shareholders. The paper has interesting policy implications
since it suggests that two-tier boards can be a valuable option in Continental Europe
where ownership structure is concentrated. It also offers support to some recent
corporate governance reforms, like the so-called Vietti reform in Italy, that have
introduced the possibility to choose between one-tier and two-tier structure of boards for
listed firms.
Keywords: Board of directors, Dual board, Corporate governance, Monitoring, Project
choice
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Recently, in the wake of corporate scandals like Enron, the reform of internal
governance mechanisms has been a highly debated issue. In particular, the struc-
ture of board of directors has been under scrutiny and several reform projects
have been proposed. Despite the debate, the theoretical literature on boards of
directors is still very limited1. Furthermore, the few theoretical models of how
board of directors function are implicitly cast in a dispersed ownership setting
where no shareholder has the incentive to monitor the CEO. However, recent
studies on corporate governance systems in both rich and developing countries
have suggested that the presence of a large shareholder active in ﬁrm’s man-
agement is much more common than previously thought. Contrary to what
happens in public company with dispersed ownership, a major problem when
ownership structure is concentrated is an ”excessive” involvement of owners in
ﬁrm’s management rather than lack of monitoring.
The present paper is a ﬁrst attempt to provide a model that examines the
optimal structure of board of directors with a controlling shareholder actively
involved in corporate goverrnance. It analyzes the choice between a one-tier
structure and a two-tier structure of board of directors in a ﬁrm where owner-
ship is concentrated in the hands of a large shareholder who sits on the board.
The main ﬁnding is that a two-tier structure can be optimal because it reduces
the large shareholder’s incentive to interfere with the manager’s initiative with-
out aﬀecting her incentive to monitor the manager’s ability. Thus, the paper
suggests that a two-tier structure of board may be a valuable option in Continen-
tal Europe where ﬁrms’ ownership (including large corporation) is concentrated.
Furthermore, it oﬀers support to some recent reform projects like, for example,
the proposal of ther High Level Group of Company Law expert of the European
Commission that recommended that listed companies have the option to choose
between one-tier and two-tier structure of boards.
The paper is related to two streams of literature. The ﬁrst one focuses on
1See for example the survey by Hermalin and Weisbach (2001)
2CEO monitoring by board of directors. In this literature the ability of the CEO
is unknown and the board is in charge of assessing CEO quality in order to decide
whether to retain or dismiss him. Monitoring is regarded as the most important
task performed by the board. See for example Hermalin and Weisbach (1998),
Hirshleifer and Thakor (1998), and Warther (1998). Hirshleifer and Thakor
study the impact of takeover threat on the board’s decision whether to retain
or dismiss the CEO and they show that the possibility of a takeover makes
the board stricter in the sense that CEO dismissal is more likely. Hermalin
a n dW e i s b a c ha n a l y z eas i t u a t i o nw h e r eC E Oa n dd i r e c t o r sb a r g a i no v e rC E O
compensation and over the level of independence of the board. Their main result
is that board’s independence is decreasing in CEO’ ability and tenure, and that
in the long run boards will be ”captured by the CEO”. Warther instead, shows
that the board of directors is an important source of discipline, despite the lack
of debate and apparent passivity.
A broader view on the tasks of boards of directors is taken by Graziano and
Luporini (2003) and Adams and Ferreira (2003). These papers analyze models
where boards of directors have more than one task. Graziano and Luporini,
study the board’s retention/dismissal decision in a setting where the board is in
charge ﬁrst of selecting the CEO and then, of deciding whether to conﬁrm or re-
place him. The paper shows that the collusive behavior between board and CEO
may emerge as an attempt to hide the board’s inability to accomplish the ﬁrst
task (CEO selection) by distorting the second task (CEO retention/dismissal
decision). Adams and Ferreira (2003) consider the advisory role of the board as
important as the monitoring role and focus on the tradeoﬀ between these two
tasks. On the one hand, if the manager shares his information with the board
he can get better advises from the directors. On the other hand the information
provided by the manager increases the risk to be ﬁred. Although the sole board
structure in their model is the ﬁrst-best solution, in a sole board the CEO may
restrain from sharing information with the board. Hence, the authors conclude
that there are cases in which it is better to separate advisory and monitoring
role using a dual board structure.
3The second stream of literature related to our work analyzes the incentive
problems arising from the conﬂicting interests of manager and large shareholder
and the role of ownership concentration as a commitment device for large share-
holder not to interfere with manager’s decision. Recently, a few studies have
pointed out that the ownership structure can serve as commitment device for
large shareholder not to interfere with manager’s initiative in project selection.
Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997) show that interference in the project se-
lection by a large shareholder reduces managerial discretion and prevents the
manager from appropriating private beneﬁts. However, ”managerial discretion
comes with beneﬁts” because it can induce the manager to make ﬁrm-speciﬁc
investment. For example, the manager can exert eﬀort to select a new invest-
ment project. In this case, the large shareholder’s right to reverse manager’s
decision and in general to interfere with his initiative, can destroy manager’s
incentive to take initiative and to make uncontractible investments. An appro-
priate ownership structure can alleviate this problem because, by decreasing her
own stake in the ﬁrm, the large shareholder decreases her incentive to interfere
with manager’s decision and this, in turn, can restore the manager’s incentive
to make ﬁrm-speciﬁc investment2.
T h en e g a t i v ee ﬀects induced by an ”excessive control” are documented in an
experiment conducted by Falck and Kosfeld (2004) who analyze the interaction
of motivation and control in a principal-agent setting where the principal decides
whether to leave a choice to the agent’s discretion or to limit the agent’s choice
set. They show that ”the decision to control signiﬁcantly reduces the agent’s
willingness to act in the interest of the principal. Explicit incentives backﬁre and
performance is lower if the principal controls compared to if he trusts” (Falck
and Kosfeld 2004, page 1)
The present model analyzes the optimal board structure building on the in-
tuition that there are cases in which it is better to separate the advisory and the
2Another theoretical paper that deals with the advantages of manager’s discretion in
project selection is Inderst and Muller (1999). They show that managerial discretion can
alleviate the agency problem between shareholders and debtholders because the manager may
avoid the excessive risk taking in project selection that characterize shareholders’ behavior
when project is ﬁnanced by debt. Then, as in the previous paper, ownership structure can be
a useful commitment device to leave the manager with discretion in project choice.
4monitoring role. It investigates how the separation of the two tasks can alleviate
the problem of large shareholder ’s interference underlined by Burkart, Gromb
and Panunzi. In particular, it shows that, a two-tier structure can restore the
manager’s incentive to exert eﬀort and get informed without reducing the large
shareholder’s incentive to monitor the manager. To this end the paper compares
a one-tier structure where all tasks are performed by the sole board controlled
by the large shareholder, with a two-tier structure where some tasks are al-
located to the management board and other tasks to the supervisory board.
In a one-tier board, project selection is discussed in board’s meeting and the
large shareholder can impose the project preferred by her. After the project
is selected, the board/large shareholder also performs its monitoring task and
decides whether to replace him. In a two-tier board, the management board
chooses the project and the supervisory board has the task to monitor the man-
a g e r .W ef o c u so nt h ec a s ei nw h i c hl a r g es h a r e h o l d e rc o n t r o l st h es u p e r v i s o r y
board but not the management board. The two boards act independently and
their behavior reﬂects the diﬀerent objectives of their members.
We show that manager can exert more eﬀort in the dual board case where he
can choose the investment project without interference by the large shareholder.
This in turn, leads to higher expected proﬁts in a two-tier structure. The
diﬀerence in proﬁts can be suﬃciently high to induce the large shareholder to
prefer a two-tier board despite the fact that in this case the manager chooses
his preferred project rather than the project preferred by the large shareholder.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic
framework. The choice of the monitoring intensity by large shareholder is ana-
lyzed in Section 3. Section 4 and 5 illustrate the choice of eﬀort by manager and
board/large shareholder in a one-tier and in a two-tier structure, respectively.
Section 6 compares the two board structures and presents the main results of
the paper. Finally, Section 7 oﬀers some concluding remarks.
52 The model
Consider a ﬁrm run by a risk neutral manager who operates under advice and
s u p e r v i s i o no ft h eb o a r do fd i r e c t o r s .O w n e r s h i pi sc o n c e n t r a t e di nt h eh a n d so f
a large shareholder who holds a fraction α of shares and sits in the board of di-
rectors. The remaining (1−α) of shares are dispersed among small investors not
represented on the board. The board has a dual role. First, it gives advice and
supports the manager in making investment decisions and, more importantly,
it approves the choice of investment projects. Then, once a project has been
undertaken, it supervises the behavior of the manager and decides whether to
retain or dismiss him. We assume that there are two types of manager: high
(H) and low (L) ability. Manager’s ability is unknown to the board/large share-
holder. However, as we explain below, the large shareholder (and/or the board)
c a ne n g a g ei nm o n i t o r i n gt oﬁnd out whether the manager is high or low ability.
Project Choice
Following Burkart et al. (1997) we assume that the ﬁrm faces N investment
projects, but only three of them are relevant. The other N−3 projects (indexed
from 4 to N) yield negative return and negative beneﬁts. Neither the manager
nor the large shareholder wants to undertake them.
Project 1 is a safe project, whose return is known and normalized to zero.
It does not give any private beneﬁt, neither to the large shareholder nor to the
manager.
Expected monetary return for project 2 and 3 are positive and dependent on
manager’s ability. Both projects are successful with probability p if the manager
is high ability and with probability q if the manager is low ability, with p>q>0.
When successful, the two projects yield proﬁts e π = π, and they yield zero proﬁts
( e π =0 )when unsuccessful. This assumption is equivalent to say that projects’
proﬁts are a random variable whose realization can be positive or equal to zero
depending on the (unknown) ability of the manager and on an unobservable
component. When such component takes very low (high) realizations, proﬁts
6are equal to zero (to π), no matter the ability of the manager. For intermediate
realizations of the state of nature, the manager makes the diﬀerence.
Manager’s type aﬀects ﬁrm’s proﬁts also in the long run. Since our model
is not dynamic, we capture this by introducing second period proﬁts and by
assuming that these proﬁts are the discounted value of all future proﬁts. Second
period proﬁts are π if the manager is high-ability type and π if the manager is
low-ability type, with π > π. These proﬁts depend only on manager’s type and
are independent of the project’s choice.
The fraction of high ability managers in the population is λ.T h u s , λp +
(1 − λ)q denotes the probability of success in the project, i.e. the expected
probability of receiving π.
The two projects diﬀer in the private beneﬁts they yield to the large share-
holder and to the manager3.P r o j e c t2 yields private beneﬁts b to the manager
and zero to the large shareholder. Project 3, on the contrary, is the project
preferred by the large shareholder: it yields her private beneﬁts B and zero to
the manager. Private beneﬁts are obtained in all states of nature, even in case
of zero proﬁts. For example, the beneﬁt may be the possibility of hiring a friend
or relative. Summarizing, the overall return of project 2 is π + b in case of
success, and it is 0+b in case of failure. Similarly, total return from project 3
is π + B if successful and 0+B otherwise.
Board Structure
As to the structure of the board, we consider two diﬀerent cases. First, we
analyze a one-tier structure where both tasks, investment selection and monitor-
ing of the manager, are attributed to a sole entity. Then, we examine a two-tier
structure where the management board deals with investment decisions and the
supervisory board controls the behavior of the manager. In the dual board case
we assume that the large shareholder sits in the supervisory board. As a con-
sequence the large shareholder does not take part in the investment decision
3The possibility to extract private beneﬁts has been largely documented in the literature.
For a discussion of the possible ways in which controlling shareholders may expropriate mi-
nority shareholders see for example Shleifer and Vishny (1997).
7taken by the management board. The management board is composed mainly
by managers with executive functions in the ﬁrm and close to the CEO. There-
fore, we focus on a situation where the preferences of the management board
are aligned to those of the CEO. In particular, we assume that the board can
enjoy part of the private beneﬁts b. For example, the CEO can expand the ﬁrm
beyond the optimal size for the personal prestige and power derived from being
the CEO of a large ﬁrm. However, this is a beneﬁt enjoyed by all members of the
management board, not only by the CEO. The monitoring function is performed
by the supervisory board where the large shareholder has the majority.
In the sole board case the large shareholder controls the board. As a result,
she controls both tasks: project selection and CEO monitoring. Thus, if large
shareholder and manager disagree on the choice of the project the large share-
holder is able to impose her decision on the manager. In the dual board case,
on the contrary, the large shareholder has no say on the project selection and
controls only the monitoring.
Information structure
Except project 1 that is immediately identiﬁable, all other projects cannot
be distinguish from one another without additional information.
The manager has to become informed to choose the ”good” project. By
exerting eﬀort e, he becomes informed with probability e, at cost e2/2.
Also the board of directors can obtain some information by exerting eﬀort
ε at cost ε2/2, but in order to use this information it needs the information
gathered by the manager. How board’s and manager’s information combine,
depends on the structure of the board.
On the basis of his personal interest, the manager decides if and how much
information to share with the board/large shareholder. We model this feature
by assuming that manager’s and board/large shareholder’s eﬀorts combine in
the following way:
Pr(manager and board are informed)=e(z + ε) (1)
8where 0 ≤ z ≤ 1 is a parameter under manager’s control. The latter’s incentive
to share information depends on the structure of the board since this in turn
determines who chooses the project. In the sole board structure, the large share-
holder can impose her decision on the manager. Thus, if the large shareholder is
informed, the manager knows that project 3 will be chosen. If instead, the large
shareholder is not informed but the manager is, project 2 will be chosen. Then,
given that project 2 is the favorite project of the manager, the latter will set the
lowest possible value for z, i.e. z =0so that he is informed with probability e
while large shareholder is informed with probability eε.
In the dual board case, CEO’s and management board’s objectives are
aligned: they both like project 2. In this case only project 1 or 2 will be selected.
The manager wants to maximize the probability of implementing project 2 and
consequently shares his information with the board by setting z =1 . Then,
project 2 is chosen with probability e(1+ε) and project 1 with complementary
probability.
Note however, that our result does not depend on the assumption that man-
ager can set the value of z. Indeed, it holds true even if we assume that the
probability of getting informed for the board/large shareholder is always eε.
Monitoring
When either project 2 or 3 has been undertaken, a signal s on future proﬁts
becomes available to the large shareholder/board. We assume that the signal is
perfectly informative and that its probabilities are equal to the true probabilities
of the return from the project. Thus, the signal is s = π with probability p if
the manager is high ability and with probability q if the manager is low ability,
and s =0with complementary probabilities.
At this stage, monitoring on the manager’s ability by the large shareholder/board
may take place. According to the result of such monitoring, the manager can
be conﬁrmed or ﬁred. Given her stake in the ﬁrm, the large shareholder has
the strongest incentive to engage in monitoring. Since other board members
tend to free ride, we consider monitoring M as a function performed by the
9large shareholder. Monitoring allows the shareholder to become informed on
the ability of the manager with probability M.
If the incumbent is ﬁred and a new manager is hired, the ﬁrm incurs in ﬁring
costs C.T h eﬁring cost captures the fact that the hiring process is costly and
it may take a while before a new manager is selected. Furthermore, the new
manager needs some time to become fully operational in the new environment.
The new manager cannot change the project selected by his predecessor. How-
ever, the probability of success in the project depends on the ability of the new
manager. Hence a gain, both in the ﬁrst-period and second period proﬁts, may
occur only if a low ability manager is replaced by a high ability one.
Monitoring depends on the choice of the project. If project 1 is selected,
ﬁrst-period proﬁts are zero no matter the ability of the manager. In this case
case, manager’s ability is relevant only for second-period proﬁts. When instead,
project 2 or project 3 are chosen, manager’s type is relevant for both ﬁrst and
second-period proﬁts. Then, the large shareholder has the strongest incentive
to monitor when either project 2 or 3 have been selected.
Summarizing, the sequence of events is the following:
- board/large shareholder randomly selects from the population a manager
of unknown ability
- manager learns his ability and decides how much eﬀort to exert to get
informed about projects
- (management) board/large shareholder decides eﬀort level to get informed
about projects
- manager decides if and how much information to share
- given the overall information available, either the manager (in a dual board
structure) or the large shareholder (in a sole board structure) decides which
project to undertake
- after observing project’s choice and a signal s on project’s return, the large
10shareholder chooses monitoring intensity
- according to the information obtained through the monitoring activity, the
large shareholder decides whether to ﬁre or retain the manager
- if incumbent manager is ﬁred, a new manager is hired. The new manager
cannot change the project but he can aﬀect proﬁts realization.
- project’s monetary return (ﬁrst-period proﬁts) and private beneﬁts are
realized
- second-period proﬁts are realized.
When making their decisions on the level of eﬀort, both the manager and
the large shareholder anticipate the latter’s subsequent choice of monitoring
intensity. We then proceed by backward induction, examining ﬁrst the large
shareholder’s decision on monitoring and using this result to analyze the choice
of eﬀort levels.
3 Monitoring
After the project is selected, the large shareholder chooses monitoring intensity.
To make the analysis interesting we concentrate our attention on monitoring
only when project 2 or 3 are undertaken4. In these cases, the large share-
holder observes a (precise) signal s on project’s return. Given the signal, she
decides whether and how much to invest in monitoring the manager. Monitoring
provides information on manager’s ability. If the large shareholder chooses to
monitor the manager with intensity M, she knows with probability M whether
the manager is good while with probability (1 − M) she is unable to identify
the type of the manager despite monitoring. The cost of monitoring is M2/2.
We focus on the case where the large shareholder invests in monitoring only
when the observed signal is bad: s =0 . In such a case she knows that under the
4Monitoring may be valuable also when project one is chosen, since second-period proﬁts
depend on manager’s type.In this case the analysis is similar to the one presented in this
paragraph, but it is less interesting since project 1 does not require any eﬀort and therefore
moniroring has no eﬀect on subsequent analysis.
11incumbent manager ﬁrst-period proﬁts will be zero, but still the manager can
be high ability and therefore it may pay to keep him. In fact, if the manager
is good there is no possibility to increase project’s return by replacing him and
there is always the risk to replace him with a low-ability manager reducing in
this way second-period proﬁts.
When instead the signal is good, s = π, the large shareholder knows for
sure that she will receive ﬁrst-period proﬁts and, since a positive signal is more
likely when the manager is good, a good signal provides, although indirectly,
some information on the probability of high second-period proﬁts. Let denote
the incumbent manager with I and the replacement with R. Formally, moni-
toring only when the signal is bad (s =0 )is more proﬁtable than monitoring
irrespective of the signal when the following inequality holds:
πPr(I = H|s = π)+π Pr(I = L|s = π) > λπ +( 1− λ)π + M Pr(I = H|s = π)(1 − λ)(π − π)
where the left-hand-side represents expected proﬁts with no monitoring after a
good signal and the right-hand-side is the expected proﬁts with monitoring after
a good signal. Observe that since Pr(I = H|s = π) > λ the above inequality
always holds if we drop the last term on the right hand side. Then, it is easy to
see that when the diﬀerence in second-period proﬁts (π − π) is not ”too” large
the inequality is satisﬁed.
We assume that the ﬁring cost C is suﬃciently small so that the manager will
be replaced when monitoring is unsuccessful. When s =0the monetary return
of the project under the incumbent manager is zero while expected project
return is positive if the incumbent is replaced. Furthermore, after observing
s =0the large shareholder revises her prior on manager’s ability and on second
period proﬁts. Indeed, since Pr(I = H|s =0 )< Pr(R = H)=λ also the
expected value of second period proﬁts is higher under a replacement than
under the incumbent manager. Let Π denote the overall proﬁts of the ﬁrm,
i.e., the sum of ﬁrst and second period proﬁts. Then, in order to make the ﬁring
of the incumbent manager proﬁtable when the monitoring does not provide
12information on manager’s type the following inequality must hold true:
E(Π|s =0 ,manager is ﬁred) ≥ E(Π|s =0 ,manager is retained)]
where
E(Π|s =0 ,manager is ﬁred)=α{πPr(π|s =0 ,R= H)λ + πλ+ π(1 − λ)} − C
and
E(Π|s =0 ,manager is retained)=α{πPr(I = H|s =0 )+πPr(I = L|s =0 ) }
It is immediate to see that πλ+ π(1 − λ) > πPr(I = H|s =0 )+πPr(I =
L|s =0 )since Pr(I = H|s =0 )< λ and Pr(I = L|s =0 )> (1 − λ). We can
thus deﬁne a cutoﬀ value C such that
E(Π|s =0 ,manager is ﬁred)=E(Π|s =0 ,manager is retained)]
Then, for C ≤ C the large shareholder prefers to ﬁre the manager when moni-
toring does not provide information on his type.
Recall that monitoring takes place only when project 2 or project 3 are cho-
sen and that the ability of the manager aﬀects only the probability of obtaining
proﬁts, not the probability of having private beneﬁts. For a given ability of the
manager, both project 2 and project 3 have the same expected proﬁts. Therefore
we can analyze monitoring independently of the choice between such projects.
With both projects, the manager is retained when the signal is good, and a
high ability manager is retained also when the signal is bad but monitoring
has revealed his ability. Recall also that the type of the manager is decisive in
determining the return from the project only in intermediate states of nature.
In very bad states of nature even a good manager can do nothing to improve
the project’s outcome. As a consequence a good manager will not be ﬁred even
if the signal indicates that project’s return will be zero, since there would be no
improvement in replacing him. Summarizing, a good manager is retained with
probability p +( 1− p)M.
13A low ability manager, instead, is retained only when the signal on project’s
proﬁts is good, s = π, and as a result the large shareholder does not monitor.
If instead the signal is bad (s =0 ) , a low ability manager is ﬁred because there
is a positive probability of getting a good new manager. In intermediate states
of nature replacing a bad with a good manager is proﬁtable. Since the large
shareholder does not know the realization of the state of nature, a manager
that the monitoring has revealed to be low ability will always be replaced. As
a consequence a bad manager is retained with probability q.
When choosing monitoring intensity the large shareholder maximizes her
expected total proﬁts that are given by the sum of fproject’s expected monetary
return (ﬁrst-period proﬁts) and second-period expected proﬁts.
E(Π)=απ Pr(I = L|s =0 )P r ( π|R = H,s =0 ) λ +
απM [Pr(I = H|s =0 )+P r ( I = L|s =0 ) λ]
+απ(1 − M)[Pr(I = H|s =0 )+P r ( I = L|s =0 ) ]λ
+απM Pr(I = L|s =0 ) ( 1− λ)
+απ(1 − M)[Pr(I = H|s =0 )+P r ( I = L|s =0 ) ]( 1− λ)
−M2/2 − C(1 − M) − C Pr(I = L|s =0 )
The ﬁrst term on the RHS is project return, which is independent of monitor-
ing. The second and third terms represent respectively expected second-period
proﬁts when incumbent manager is high-ability type and when the incumbent is
replaced by a high-ability type if monitoring is not successful. In the same man-
ner the fourth and ﬁfth terms represent expected second-period proﬁts when the
incumbent manager is low-ability type and when the incumbent is replaced by
a low-ability type if monitoring is not successful, respectively. Finally, the last
two terms represent the ﬁring costs when monitoring is not successful and when
it is, respectively. Then, from the ﬁrst order condition we obtain the optimal
monitoring intensity:
M∗ =P r ( I = H|s =0 )[ C + α(1 − λ)(π − π)]
14The monitoring intensity M∗ is positively correlated with the expected cost
of ﬁring a high-ability manager if the decision is based only on the signal on
project’s return (Pr(I = H|s =0 ) C), with the large shareholder’s fraction of
shares α, and ﬁnally with the diﬀerence in expected second-period proﬁts if the
manager is replaced.
4T h e c h o i c e o f e ﬀorts in a sole board structure
Let us ﬁrst consider the manager’s choice of eﬀort in a one-tier structure. Project
selection is discussed in the board where the large shareholder has the majority
of votes. The large shareholder wants to maximize B+αE(Π) while the manager
wants to maximize b +δE(Π) where δE(Π) represents the variable component
of his salary, having normalized to zero the ﬁxed component.5 Given that an
informed large shareholder imposes the choice of project 3 on the manager, in a
sole board structure there is no information sharing because the manager has no
incentive to cooperate with the large shareholder in processing information, i.e.
the manager sets z =0 . As a consequence the manager becomes informed with
probability e, while the large shareholder is informed with probability eε. The
latter represents the probability of project 3 being selected. With probability
e(1−ε) only the manager is informed and in this case he can choose his preferred
project, i.e. project 2. Finally, with probability (1 − e) neither the manager
nor the owner is informed and project 1 is chosen yielding zero proﬁts and zero
private beneﬁts.
The maximization problem of the manager
When making his decision, the manager knows his own type. Hence, a high
ability manager chooses the optimal level of eﬀort eH∗
S (where subscript s stands
for sole board) taking into account that if project 2 is selected, he will be retained
5For simplicity we rule out the possibility that the manager owns shares of the ﬁrm. δπ is
received only if the manager is still employed by the ﬁrm when proﬁts are realized.
15with probability p +( 1− p)M∗.H et h e ns o l v e s :
max
e eε∗
Spδπ + e(1 − ε∗
S)[b(p +( 1− p)M∗)+pδπ] − e2/2.
In case of interior solution, from the ﬁrst-order condition we obtain:
e
H
S =( 1− ε∗
S)b[p +( 1− p)M∗]+pδπ. (2)
Hence
eH∗






Analogously, a low ability manager chooses the optimal level of eﬀort eL∗
S taking




Sqδπ+ e(1 − ε∗
S)q(b + δπ) − e2/2.
In case of interior solution, from the ﬁrst-order condition we obtain:
eL
S =( 1− ε∗
S)bq + qδπ. (3)
Hence
eL∗

















Manager’s eﬀort is negatively correlated with the eﬀort (hence the probabil-
ity) of the large shareholder to become informed ε∗
S. This is so because a higher
value of ε∗
S reduces the probability of implementing project 2, the preferred
project of the manager.
16Notice that the eﬀort of the good manager depends (positively) on the level
of monitoring exerted by the large shareholder, while the eﬀort of the bad
manager does not. This happens because, the higher the monitoring intensity,
the higher is the probability that a good manager will be conﬁrmed, which in
turn increases the incentive to exert eﬀort. The bad manager instead is always
ﬁred when the return of the project is zero, independently of the outcome of
monitoring. In fact he is ﬁred both when the large shareholder is able to identify
his type and when she is not.
The maximization problem of the Board (Large Shareholder)
Since in the sole board case the large shareholder controls the board, we identify
the board with the large shareholder. When making its decision on the optimal
level of eﬀort ε∗
S, the large shareholder does not know the type of the manager.







S [B + απp]+( 1− λ)eL∗







S απp +( 1− λ)eL∗






where γ =P r ( π|R = H,s =0 )P r ( R = H) is the probability of obtaining ﬁrst-
period proﬁts π when a bad manager is replaced following the observation of
s =0 .










S =m i n[ εS,1].
The eﬀort level chosen by the large shareholder depends positively on her private
beneﬁt B and on the manager’s eﬀort e∗
S. When the private beneﬁt tends to zero
17also the large shareholder’s eﬀort to become informed tends to zero since in this
case she is indiﬀerent between project 2 and 3. For B positive but smaller than
1,t h eo p t i m a le ﬀort level is smaller than one: ε∗
S < 1. Finally, when the private
beneﬁti ss u ﬃciently large (say equal or greater than B), the optimal eﬀort
becomes equal to one, ε∗
S =1 . When the share of proﬁts of the manager is high




also the large shareholder makes the highest eﬀort provided that her private





S =1 , the large shareholder is informed with certainty, which
implies that she will choose her preferred project, i.e. project 3. In general
the large shareholder’s eﬀort is positively correlated with the manager’s eﬀort
because the higher is e∗
S, and the higher is the marginal eﬀect of an increase in ε∗
S
in terms of an increase in the probability of choosing project 3. The probability
of choosing project 3 is higher than that of choosing project 2 only if εS > 1/2.
However, since the eﬀort of the manager is needed for large shareholder to
become informed, for low values of e∗
S the large shareholder has no incentive
to exert high level of εS because the probability of choosing project 3 is low
compared to that of choosing project 1.




B[δπ(λp +( 1− λ)q)+b[λ(p +( 1− p)M∗)+( 1− λ)q)]
1+Bb[λ(p +( 1− p)M∗)+( 1− λ)q)]
(5)
Note that if the manager does not receive any share of proﬁts, i.e., δ =0 , then
the optimal eﬀort of large shareholder is smaller than one, ε∗
S = εS < 1. In
this case, when her private beneﬁts B increases, her eﬀort to become informed
increases as well (∂εS/∂B>0) but never reaches 1. A tt h es a m et i m eeH∗
S and
eL
S asymptotically tend to 0.
If we substitute back the optimal value of εS in the eﬀort levels chosen by
the manager we get:
eH
S = δπp +
[1 − Bδπ(λp +( 1− λ)q)]b(p +( 1− p)M∗)
1+Bb[λ(p +( 1− p)M∗)+( 1− λ)q)]
eL
S = δπq +
[1 − Bδπ(λp +( 1− λ)q)]bq
1+Bb[λ(p +( 1− p)M∗)+( 1− λ)q)]
18Deﬁne:
ZH ≡ b(p +( 1− p)M∗),
ZL ≡ bq
Z ≡ λZH +( 1− λ)ZL ≡ b[λ(p +( 1− p)M∗)+( 1− λ)q)],
∆H ≡ δπp
∆L ≡ δπq
∆ ≡ λ∆H +( 1− λ)∆L = δπ(λp +( 1− λ)q)
W ec a nt h e nw r i t e :
eH
S = ∆H +
ZH(1−B∆)
1+BZ ,e L





Since the way eﬀorts change as private beneﬁts increase is crucial for our result,
we establish the following lemma.
Lemma 1: ε∗
S is continously increasing in B,f r o mε∗
S =0for B =0to
ε∗
S =1for B = B where B =1 /∆ if ∆ ≤ 1 while B =1if ∆ > 1.. ei
S





S = ∆i + Zi if
∆i + Zi < 1, and ei
S =1if ∆i + Zi ≥ 1 while ei
S = ∆i if ∆i < 1,e i
S =1if
∆i ≥ 1,i = H,L.







5T h e c h o i c e o f e ﬀorts in a dual board structure
Let us now consider a two-tier structure with a management and a supervisory
board. As discussed above we consider the case where the large shareholder
sits on the supervisory board where she has the majority. Recall also that we
assume that the management board is composed mainly by managers close to
the CEO and that they can enjoy part of the manager’s private beneﬁts b.I n
particular, we assume that the board can enjoy a fraction β1 of the beneﬁts b
19and that this does not reduce the private beneﬁts of the CEO. In other words
we are considering the beneﬁts b as a sort of ”public” good with respect to the
CEO and the members of the management board. Directors care also for the
ﬁnancial return of the project. Their objective function is β1b + β2E(Π).
This implies that both the management board and the CEO have the same
preferences among investment projects. If they are informed they will always
choose project 2, otherwise they will choose project 1. As a consequence, the
value of z in eq.(1) will be set equal to 1, implying that project 2 will be
selected with probability e(1+ε) while project 1 will be chosen with probability
1 − e(1 + ε).
The maximization problem of the manager
A high ability manager chooses the optimal level of eﬀort eH∗
D taking into
account that if project 2 is selected, he will be retained with probability p +
(1 − p)M∗.H et h e ns o l v e s :
max
e e(1 + ε∗
D)[b(p +( 1− p)M∗)+pδπ] − e2/2.















Analogously, a low ability manager chooses the optimal level of eﬀort eL∗
D taking
into account that if project 2 is selected, he will be retained with probability q.
He then solves:
max
e e(1 + ε)q[b + δπ] − e2/2.
In case of interior solution, from the ﬁrst-order condition we obtain:
eL















Again, the eﬀort of the good manager depends on the monitoring by the large
shareholder, while the eﬀort of the bad manager does not, because the bad
manager is always ﬁred when the return of the project is known to be zero.
The maximization problem of the Management Board
When making its decision on the optimal level of eﬀort ε∗
D, the board does
not know the type of the manager6.T a k i n gi n t oa c c o u n tt h a tab a dm a n a g e r




D(1 + ε)[β1b + β2πp]+
(1 − λ)eL
D(1 + ε)[β1b + β2π(q +( 1− q)γ)] −
ε2
2
In case of an interior solution, the ﬁrst-order condition gives:
εD = λe
H
D [β1b + β2πp]+( 1− λ)eL
D [β1b + β2π(q +( 1− q)γ)]. (8)






λA +( 1− λ)C
1 − [λA +( 1− λ)C]
(9)
where
A ≡ b[p +( 1− p)M∗ + pδπ][β1b + β2πp]
and
C ≡ q[b + δπ][β1b + β2π (q +( 1− q)γ)].
6In the dual board case it may be reasonable to assume that the management board
knows the type of the CEO. Our main result still holds under this assumption. However,
for symmetry with the sole board case we prefer to maintain that the board doesn’t know
whether the CEO is high or low ability.
21This implies that an interior solution exists, if λA +( 1− λ)C<1/2, 7while
εD =0otherwise. Hence
ε∗
D =m a x[ 0 ,εD].
Note that if e
H∗
D = eL∗
D =1 , ε∗
D =0 In fact, when the manager is informed with
certainty, there is no reason for the management board to acquire additional
information because of the information sharing.
Finally, if we substitute back the value of εD in the expressions for the




b[p +( 1− p)M∗]+pδπ





1 − [λA +( 1− λ)C]
.
6 One-Tier versus Two-Tier board
We are now in a position to make a comparison between the sole and the dual
board structure. First of all we consider the eﬀorts. Comparing (2) with (6),
(3) with (7) and (5) with (9) it immediately follows:
Lemma 2: The level of eﬀort exerted by the manager is higher in a dual board







i = H,L. The level of eﬀort exerted by the board is higher in a dual board
t h a ni nt h es o l eb o a r ds t r u c t u r e(εD > εS) if and only if the large shareholder’s
private beneﬁts B are lower than the threshold value e B where e B is deﬁned by:
e B ≡
εD
δπ(λp +( 1− λ)q)
+
εD
(1 − εD)b[λ(p +( 1− p)M∗)+( 1− λ)q)]
The level of eﬀort exerted by the manager is higher in a dual board structure
because the manager, by choosing project 2 when informed, can appropriate
7Note that this is also a necessary and suﬃcient condition for εD < 1.
22private beneﬁts b. As to the eﬀort exerted by the board, we have to consider
the private beneﬁts of the owner relatively to the threshold level e B,w h i c hi s
lower the lower are b, β1, β2 and γ. In other terms we have to compare the
private beneﬁts of the large shareholder (in the sole board case) with the gains
appropriable by the management board (in the dual board case). Only if such
gains are particularly high, εD > εS,o t h e r w i s et h ee ﬀort exerted by the board
will be higher in the sole board structure. This can be better understood in the
special case in which neither the manager nor the members of the management
board receive any share of proﬁts, i.e. when δ = β2 =0 . In this case e B =
β1b
1−2[λ(p+(1−p)M)+(1−λ)q)]β1b2. The positive relationship between the value of e B
and the private beneﬁt of the management board is immediately evident. On
the contrary, note that when the amount of proﬁts appropriable by the manager
is particularly high, e∗
S =1implying εD =0and εS > εD.
Expected proﬁts are equal to
E(ΠS)=eH∗
S λpπ + eL∗
S (1 − λ)[q +( 1− q)γ]π (10)
under the sole board structure, and to
E(ΠD)=eH∗
D (1 + ε∗
D)λpπ + eL∗
D (1 + ε∗
D)(1 − λ)[q +( 1− q)γ]π (11)
under the dual board structure. The question is whether expected proﬁts are
higher in the sole or in the dual structure. Since the value of the ﬁrm depends
on expected proﬁts, minority shareholders obviously prefer the structure that
maximizes E(Π). This is not necessarily the case for the large shareholder who
is also interested in private beneﬁts. Recalling that private beneﬁts are obtained
when project 3 is undertaken, i.e. with probability e∗
Sε∗
S, the expected gain to
the large shareholder is:
E(GS)=ε∗
SB(λeH∗





S λp + eL∗









D λp + eL∗
D (1 − λ)[q +( 1− q)γ]
ª
(13)
23under the dual board structure.
Proposition: Expected proﬁts are higher under the dual board structure, i.e.
minority shareholders are better oﬀ in a dual board structure.
If δ =0 , either E(GD) ≥ 1/2 and the large shareholder always prefers the
dual board structure or E(GD) < 1/2 and there exists a threshold value b B>0
such that the large shareholder prefers the dual board structure iﬀ B<b B.
If δ > 0, either ∆L+ZL < 1 (implying eS
L < 1)a n dt h e r ee x i s t sat h r e s h o l d
value b B>0 such that the large shareholder prefers the dual board structure if
B<b B, or ∆L + ZL > 1 (implying eS
L =1 ) and there exist cases in which the
large shareholder prefers the sole board structure independently of the value of
B.
Proof: see the Appendix.
The above proposition shows that, as long as the private beneﬁts of the
large shareholder are not ”too large”, the higher eﬀort exerted by manager in
the two-tier board structure may lead the large shareholder to prefer such a
structure to the one-tier board. Thus, there are cases in which the objective
of large shareholder and minority shareholders are aligned. The proposition
indicates that the large shareholder is more likely to prefer the dual board
structure when the manager does not receive any incentive pay, i.e. δ =0 .T h i s
is so, because when δ =0the manager does not have other incentive to exert
eﬀort than the private beneﬁt he obtains if project 2 is chosen. However, in
the sole board structure project 2 is less likely to be implemented and this in
turn implies a smaller managerial eﬀort than in the dual board case. When
δ > 0 there may exist cases in which the sole board structure is preferred by
the large shareholder even for low values of B. Note, however, that a necessary





H =1 ) which restricts this case to a quite small range of the
parameters. We can then conclude that generally for low enough values of the
private beneﬁts B, the large shareholder prefers the dual board structure.
247 Conclusions and Extensions
We have shown in a very simple setting that, when ownership is concentrated in
the hands of a large shareholder, a two-tier board of directors where the large
shareholder sits on the upper-level board can be a useful device to commit not
to interfere with manager’s initiative. By comparing a two-tier with a one-tier
structure we show that the two-tier board has the advantage to leave initiative to
the lower level board (the management board). As a result, manager’s eﬀort in
gathering information on projects is higher in the two-tier structure and this in
turn leads to higher proﬁts than in the one-tier structure where large shareholder
controls the board. The higher managerial eﬀort comes with no reduction in
shareholder’s monitoring on manager’s quality. Indeed, the monitoring intensity
is equal in the two cases. We restricted our attention to the choice between one-
tier versus two-tier board of directors, but the result of the paper may extend to
other possible organizations of the board that limit the power and interference of
large shareholder. The dual board structure represents just an opportunity for
the large shareholder to commit not to interfere with the management. In the
absence of such a structure, it would be more diﬃcult for the large shareholder
to credibly commit not to reverse the project choice made by the management,
even if ex-ante it could be proﬁt a b l ef o rh e rt od os o .
The paper has important policy implications since the dual board structure
is quite common in Continental Europe where concentrated ownership is still
the norm. In some countries, as Germany, Austria Belgium, the dual structure
is mandatory, in other countries as France and Italy companies can choose be-
tween diﬀerent board models. Our paper shows that indeed dual boards may be
optimal in these countries given their ownership structure, and it oﬀers support
to some corporate reforms, like the recent reform in Italy, that has introduced
the choice between one-tier and two-tier board structure (for a discussion of
recent European corporate reforms see Hopt and Leyens (2004)).
Finally, observe that if the large shareholder sits in the supervisory board and
does not interfere with manager’s decision there is also an important eﬀect on
25the conﬂict of interest between majority and minority shareholders. Indeed, the
large shareholder by restricting her interference in ﬁrm management restricts
also her ability to expropriate wealth from minority shareholders. Although
there may be other instruments to limit the ability to expropriate minority
shareholders, as corporate law or the role of independent directors (see for ex-
ample Anderson and Reeb 2003) also a two-tier structure of board of directors,
by separating ﬁrm’s management and control, goes in this direction.
I nt h i sp a p e rw eh a v ea s s u m e dt h a tp r i v a t eb e n e ﬁts do not aﬀect proﬁts, i.e.
the consumption of private beneﬁts does not reduce the cash ﬂow obtained from
the project. A natural extension of the paper is to assume that private beneﬁts
have a monetary cost reﬂected in a lower level of proﬁts and that the level of
private beneﬁts is not exogenously given but is chosen by the recipient (either
the manager or the large shareholder). This introduces an asymmetry between
the consumption of private beneﬁts by the manager and by large shareholder. If
manager’s beneﬁts reduce the level of proﬁts this increases the probability that
the manager will be removed. Thus the manager has to tradeoﬀ the utility of
consuming the beneﬁt sa n dt h ei n c r e a s e dr i s ko fb e i n gﬁred. This put a limit
on the optimal quantity of beneﬁts he wants to appropriate. When instead
private beneﬁts are consumed by the large shareholder there is no limitation
in the quantity of beneﬁts consumed other than the reduction in the proﬁts
she can appropriate but it is well known that this constrain is ineﬃcient when
the fraction of shares held is small. We are currently working on this extended
setup that has the advantage to take into consideration, in addition to the
conﬂict between manager and large shareholder, also the conﬂict of interest
b e t w e e nm a j o r i t ya n dm i n o r i t ys h a r e h o l d e r sw h i c hi sv e r yc o m m o ni nc o u n t r i e s
with concentrated ownership.
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289 Appendix
Proof of the Proposition. That expected proﬁts are higher under the dual board
structure follows immediately from (10), (11) and the above Lemma.
To prove the part on expected gains note that b B is the value of B, that
equates (12) to (13). Deﬁne:
XH ≡ pπ,
XL ≡ [q +( 1− q)γ]π,













The proof is divided in two cases according to δ being positive or equal to 0.
Case 1: δ > 0. This implies ∆H,∆L > 0.
Recalling that ei∗
D ≥ ei∗
S ,i= H,L, where the equality holds iﬀ ei∗
S =1 , we know














Note that these holds as equalities if and only if eL
S =1(i.e. ∆L +ZL > 1),




D=0. We will divide the present
case into three steps: step 1 will consider the case of B ≥ B, step2 the case of
B<B and ∆L + ZL < 1, while step 3 will consider the case of B<B and
∆L + ZL > 1.
W en o ww a n tt os h o wt h a tE(GS) is ﬁrst continuously decreasing and then
continuously increasing in B, implying that the threshold level b B>0 exists.








2 = α[XHλ∆H + XL (1 − λ)∆L]+
1
2 for B = B.








S + XL(1 − λ)eL
S
¤
+ BeS − 1
2
which is clearly continuously increasing in B, from E(GS)B for B = B =1 /∆
to ∞.
Step 2. Consider then the case of B<B and ∆L + ZL < 1.















(1+BZ)2 [−M + εs]
where M can take one of the following values:
M1 = αXL(1 − λ)ZL
M2 = α[XHλZH + XL (1 − λ)ZL].
First of all note that if αXL (1 − λ)ZL ≥ 1,
∂E(GS)
∂B is always negative for
B<B, implying that E(GS) is continously decreasing from E(GS)0 to E(GS)B.
When αXL (1 − λ)ZL < 1, t h r e ec a s e sa r ep o s s i b l e :i )M = M1 for B going
from 0 to B; ii) M = M1 for B going from 0 to B(M1) then M = M2; iii)
M = M2 for B going from 0 to B.
i)
∂E(GS)
∂B is negative for εs <M 1 and positive for εs >M 1, implying that
E(GS) is ﬁrst continously decreasing and then increasing;
iii) if M2 ≥ 1,
∂E(GS)
∂B is always negative for B<B, implying that E(GS)
is continously decreasing from E(GS)0 to E(GS)B. If M2 < 1, is negative for
εs <M 2 and positive for εs >M 2, implying that E(GS) is ﬁrst continously
decreasing and then increasing;
ii) three subcases are possible: a) if εs ≥ M2 for B = B(M1),
∂E(GS)
∂B is
negative for εs <M 1 and positive for εs >M 1, implying that E(GS) is ﬁrst
continously decreasing and then increasing; b) if εs <M 2 < 1 for B = B(M1),
∂E(GS)
∂B is negative for εs <M 1, positive for M1 < εs <E s(B(M1)), negative
for εs(B(M1))<εs <M 2 and positive for εs >M 2, implying that E(GS) is ﬁrst
30continously decreasing, then increasing, then decreasing, and ﬁnally increasing;
c) if εs <M 2 for B = B(M1) with M2 ≥ 1, w eh a v et h es a m er e s u l ta si nc a s e
b) except that now it cannot be εs >M 2.
In conclusion, considering also step1,w h e n∆L + ZL < 1,E (GS) is either
ﬁrst monotonically increasing decreasing and then monotonically increasing,
or it alternates decreasing and increasing intervals up to B = B, and then
continously increases up to inﬁnity. In any case, since E(GS)0 <E (GD)0 and
E(GS) is bounded up to B = B, the existence of b B>0 follows.
Step 3. Consider then the case of B<B and ∆L + ZL > 1.
If ∆L ≥ 1 (implying ∆L +( 1− B)ZL ≥ 1 since B =1 ),e i∗
S =1 ,i= H,L,
independently of the value of B, and εs = B. T h ee x p e c t e dg a i no ft h el a r g e
shareholder becomes:
E(GS)=α[XHλ + XL(1 − λ)] + B2
2
which is clearly continuously increasing in B, from α[XHλ + XL(1 − λ)] for
B =0to α[XHλ + XL(1 − λ)]+1/2 for B = B (recall that in this case B =1 ).
If ∆L < 1 (implying ∆L +( 1− B)ZL < 1, since B>1),.The derivative of















(1+BZ)2 [−M + εs]
where M can now take one of the following values:
0
M1 = αXL(1 − λ)ZL
M2 = α[XHλZH + XL (1 − λ)ZL].
Two cases are possible: i) M =0for B going from 0 to B(M1), then M = M1
up to B; ii) M =0for B going from 0 to B(M1), then M = M1 up to B(M2),
then M = M2 up to B.
31i) if εs ≥ M1 for B = B(M1),
∂E(GS)
∂B is positive and E(GS) is continously
increasing from B =0to B = B. If εs <M 1 for B = B(M1),
∂E(GS)
∂B is positive
for B<B (M1) then for B>B (M1) it is negative for εs <M 1 and positive for
εs >M 1.As a consequence E(GS) is ﬁrst increasing, then decreasing and then
increasing again.
ii) four subcases are possible: a) εs ≥ M1 for B = B(M1) and εs ≥ M2
for B = B(M2).Then
∂E(GS)
∂B is everywhere positive and E(GS) is continously
increasing from B =0to B = B;
b) εs <M 1 for B = B(M1) and εs ≥ M2 for B = B(M2).
∂E(GS)
∂B is positive
for B<B (M1),then for B>B (M1) it is negative for εs <M 1 and positive for
εs >M 1.As a consequence E(GS) is ﬁrst increasing, then decreasing and then
increasing again;
c) εs <M 1 for B = B(M1) and εs <M 2 < 1 for B = B(M2).
∂E(GS)
∂B
is positive for B<B (M1),then for B(M1) <B<B (M2) it is negative for
εs <M 1 and positive for εs >M 1,.while for B>B (M2) it is negative for
εs <M 2 and positive for εs >M 2.As a consequence E(GS) is ﬁrst increasing,
then decreasing, then increasing, then decreasing and ﬁnally increasing.
d) εs <M 1 for B = B(M1) and εs <M 2 for B = B(M2) with M2 > 1. We
h a v et h es a m er e s u l ta si nc a s ec )e x c e p tt h a tn o wi tc a n n o tb eεs >M 2.
Now for B =0 ,E (GD)=E(GS). Since for B>0 E(GS) is either con-
tinously increasing, or becomes increasing after an interval in which it alter-
nates increasing and decreasing spans we know that the threshold level b B does
not exist. Nevertheless we cannot exclude cases in which after a ﬁrst interval
in which E(GD) <E (GS), there is one (or there are two) intervals in which
E(GD) >E (GS). In any case sooner or later E(GS) becomes again greater
than E(GD).
Case 2: δ =0 . This implies ∆ =0 . The eﬀorts’ levels now become:
ei
S = Zi





(1+BZ)2 < 0 ∂εS
∂B = Z
(1+BZ)2 > 0
εS =0when B =0and is increasing in B, but never reaches 1. When
εS =0 ,e i
S = ei
S = Zi. As εS approaches 1 for B →∞ , ei
S asymptotically tends
to 0.











Note that E(GS)=αXeS = α[XHλZH + XL (1 − λ)ZL] when B =0 ,
while E(GS)=1 /2 − x with x arbitrarily small when B →∞ .
















(1+BZ)2 {−α[XHλZH + XL (1 − λ)ZL]+εS}
Hence:
for α[XHλZH + XL (1 − λ)ZL] ≥ 1,
∂E(GS)
∂B is negative independently of
the value of B, implying that E(GS) is continuously decreasing from
α[XHλZH + XL (1 − λ)ZL] for B =0to 1/2 − x for B →∞ .
for α[XHλZH + XL(1− λ)ZL] < 1,
∂E(GS)
∂B is negative for
εS < α[XHλZH + XL(1 − λ)ZL] and positive for higher values of εS, implying
that E(GS) is ﬁrst continuously decreasing (starting from α[XHλZH + XL (1 − λ)ZL]
for B =0 )and then continuously increasing as εS approaches 1, up to 1/2 − x
for B →∞ .
As a consequence, E(GS) is maximized for B =0if α[XHλZH + XL (1 − λ)ZL] ≥
1 and for B →∞otherwise.
We know that for B =0E(GD)>E(GS). Hence b B exists only when E(GD) <
1/2 and E(GS) is maximized for B →∞ .
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